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The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents
Jeremy Bulow, Stanford Business School
Executive Summary
Paragraph IV of the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a mechanism for the litiga-
tion of pharmaceutical patent infringement disputes. Many of these caseshave
been settled with reverse payments by the brand to the generic in return for
delayed generic product entry. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has con-
tested several of these settlements with good but not complete success. This
paper discusses the merits of treating settlements thatinclude side payments
or deals that are beneficial to the generic asillegal per se. The paper also de-
scribes several additional strategies in addition to side payments, some of
which raise serious antitrust problems, that brands have used to keep generics
out of the market.
I.Introduction
Agreements between brand-name pharmaceutical companiesand po-
tential generic entrants that purport to settle patent litigation have been
the subject of much antitrust scrutiny over the last several years. These
agreements, referred to as Hatch-Waxman agreements,share several
features: (1) each occurred in the context of patent litigation between
branded and generic pharmaceutical companies that arose under the
complex regulatory provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act;' (2) each in-
volved substantial payments from the brand-name incumbent to the
potential generic entrant; and (3) each involved the potential generic
entrant agreeing to stay off the market for a definedperiod of time.
The stakes are sometimes quite large; in the biggest settlement, a brand
with annual sales of over $750 million kept a generic off themarket
for over six years.
Since March 2000, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)has an-
nounced four prosecutorial actions involving Hatch-Waxman agree-
ments. Three were resolved by consent decrees,2and the fourth was146 Bulow
litigated administratively and is on appeal to the Federal Trade Conunis-
sion.3 The administrative law judge (AU) in this action found that two
Hatch-Waxman agreements were legal under a rule of reason analysis.
Private plaintiffs have also challenged Hatch-Waxman agreements.
Two federal district courts have invalidatedunder aper se theory
three Hatch-Waxman agreements (both cases have been appealed);4
and at least two other federal district court cases that also involve chal-
lenges to Hatch-Waxman agreements are pending.5
Taken together, these actions have indicated that Hatch-Waxman
agreements involving reverse licensing payments from the brand-
name company to the generic in return for delayed entry can be prob-
lematic under the antitrust laws. Some have argued that these potential
problems do not render the Hatch-Waxman agreements per se unlaw-
ful because the agreements have two offsetting procompetitive justifi-
cations: (1) each claims to settle patent litigation either partiallyor fully,
and (2) with exception of the agreement between Abbott and Geneva,
each has allowed for entry by the generic at a date earlier than patent
expiration.
Both the FTC and the courts have thus far limited their analysis of
any one agreement to the facts pertaining only to that agreement. Thus,
a fundamental question remains unanswered: under what circum-
stances can a Hatch-Waxman agreement be assumed on its face to harm
consumer welfare and thus be condemned as per se illegal?6
The analysis of this paper implies that:
Hatch-Waxman agreements in which a brand-name manufacturer
pays a potential generic entrant more than nominal consideration in
return for staying off the market will harm consumers, and welfare
would be increased if such agreements were presumptively unlawful.
Hatch-Waxman agreements in which a brand-name manufacturer
and a potential generic entrant agree on an entry date for the generic
product, and at the same time the brand-name manufacturerpays the
generic for (seemingly) imrelated rights, will inevitably lead to delayed
entryunless the payment to the generic for the unrelated rights is
clearly not more than the generic could have received selling the rights
independently. Making such agreements presumptively unlawful
would increase welfare.
Hatch-Waxman agreements in which a brand-name manufacturer
and potential generic entrant agree on an entry date for the generic
product, but in which no payment is made from the brand-namemanu-The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents 147
facturer to the generic entrant, may or may not increase consumer wel-
fare, depending on the specific case.
However, an agreement with no side payments may create an anti-
trust violation if, because of its interaction with Hatch-Waxman rules
on generic exclusivity, it delays entry of other competitors. Even if the
agreement involves royalty payments by the generic to the brand and
does not deter other entry, an antitrust problem may exist if the ge-
neric's marginal per-pill licensing fee exceeds its average per-pill li-
censing fee. Similarly, pseudo-generic entry as part of a settlement can
be problematic if it blocks other entry.
Even beyond the settlement process, the major drug companies have
learned to game the system to delay competition, creating a need for
a fresh look at the special Hatch-Waxman provisions that govern phar-
maceutical patent infringement litigation.
Perhaps no industry, with the possible exception of computers, has
contributed more to social welfare over the past fifty years than the
pharmaceutical industry. Ironically, for that very reason, vigilant anti-
trust enforcement in this area is critical. If Coke and Pepsi were allowed
to merge, the consequences would be higher prices and lower con-
sumption of sodaarguably a good thing from a welfare standpoint.
Artificial price increases for valuable medicines are quite another
matter.
Section II provides a brief overview of the key Hatch-Waxman
provisions. Section III summarizes the major litigation to date, while
Section IV summarizes the results of the 2002 FTC study of Hatch-
Waxman cases. Section V discusses the economics and game theory
issues that arise in settlements, ultimately incorporating the key special
Hatch-Waxman provisions. Section VI discusses problematic settle-
ments that would be anticompetitive in patent lawsuits more generally,
not just under Hatch-Waxman. Section VII concludes with suggestions
for reforming the main provisions of the act.
II.Hatch-Waxman Overview7
Pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, a brand-name
company seeking to market a new drug product must first obtain Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) approval by ffling a new drug applica-
tion (NDA). Included in this filing is information that is expensive and
time consuming to create (such as clinical studies) relating to the safety148 Bulow
and effectiveness of the product. Lourie (1989) found, for sixty-five
drugs, that an average of 1.3 years passed between patent grant and the
beginning of clinical trials, that clinical trials took an additional 3.8 years,
and that FDA review took an additional 2.6 years, leaving a little over
nine years left after approval on the old seventeen-year patent system.8
The Hatch-Waxman Act increased patent and exclusivity protection
for brands while making postpatent entry easier for generics. Manufac-
turers are allowed to extend one patent for each new chemical entity,
with extensions usually on a drug's chemical compound (a product
patent) but sometimes on the use of a drug.9 Extensions must be ap-
plied for within 60 days of FDA approval of the marketing of the drug
and may be for up to half the time the drug spent in clinical trials plus
all the time it spent in FDA review, subject to a maximum extension
of five years and a maximum effective life of fourteen years. The Con-
gressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that, between 1992 and 1995,
of 101 drugs containing new chemical compounds, sixty-seven were
eligible for Hatch-Waxman extensions (nineteen having no patent to
extend and fifteen having fourteen years of exclusivity already), and
of these, sixty-three applied for extensions. On the whole, the average
time that a brand has been able to market under patent has increased
from about nine to about 11.5 years.1°
Furthermore, the act provides that the FDA not accept a generic ap-
plication to produce a new chemical entity for a minimum of five years,
benefiting drugs with no or very short patent protection. Since ap-
proval of such an application averages over thirty months, effective
exclusivity is even longer. Finally, manufacturers can use NDAs or
supplemental NDAs to obtain additional years of market exclusivity
(as opposed to patent extension) for new dosage forms, for a new use,
or for marketing a drug over the counter provided the NDA requires
additional clinical testing.
The other side of Hatch-Waxman is its facilitation of generic entry.
When an NDA is filed, the brand-name company provides the FDA
with information regarding patents covering the product that is the
subject of the NDA.'1 Upon approval of the NDA, the FDA lists the
patents in an agency publication commonly known as the Orange
Book.'2 Hatch-Waxman allows a generic firm to ifie an abbreviated new
drug approval (ANDA), which means that it has to show only that its
product is bioequivalent to a referenced NDA's brand-name product
and also that the generic product has the same active ingredient, dos-
age form and strength, and proposed labeling as the brand-nameprod-The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents 149
uct. The act also made clear that generics may use the patent drug to
develop their ANDA even before patent expiration. Allowing for
ANDA filings has tremendously expanded the availability of generic
pharmaceuticals. According to the Congressional Budget Office (1998),
the usual period between patent expiration and generic entry has fallen
from three to four years to frequently one to three months, the generic
share of prescription drug volume rose from 19 percent in 1984 to 47
percent in 1996, and the percentage of top-selling drugs facing generic
competition increased from 36 percent in 1983 to nearly 100 percent in
1998.
An ANDA must contain a certification regarding each patent listed
in the Orange Book covering a referenced NDA. One of four such certi-
fications are made:
"Paragraph I Certification"certifying that patent information has
not been filed in connection with an NDA. The FDA may approve im-
mediately an ANDA making this certification.
"Paragraph II Certification"certifying that a patent covering an
NDA has expired. Again, the FDA may approve immediately an
ANDA making this certification.
"Paragraph III Certification"certifying that ANDA approval is
soight after a listed patent expires. The FDA may approve the ANDA
only after such patent expiration.
"Paragraph IV Certification"certifying that a listed patent is either
invalid or will not be infringed by the generic drug for which the
ANDA applicant seeks approval.13
Paragraph IV ANDAs implicate two additional provisions of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, both of which relate to the FDA's approval of an
ANDA. First is the automatic thirty-month stay protection afforded
brand-name companies. As part of a Paragraph IV certification, an
ANDA filer must provide to the patent holder and NDA filer (which
is often, but not always, the same company) a notice of the Paragraph
IV certification as well as a detailed statement of the factual and legal
bases for the ANDA filer's assertion that a patent is invalid or not in-
fringed on by the ANDA filer's generic product. Once the ANDA filer
has provided such notice, a patent holder must file an infringement
suit within forty-five days to take advantage of the statutory stay provi-
sion. If a suit is not filed within forty-five days, the FDA can approve
the ANDA as soon as the regulatory requirements are fulfflled.14 Filing150 Bulow
a patent infringement suit within forty-five days, however, stays FDA
approval of the ANDA until the earliest of: (1) the date the patent ex-
pires, (2) a court determination of noninfringement or patent invalidity
by a court in the patent litigation,'5 or (3) thirty months after a patent
holder was notified of the Paragraph IV certification.
Second is the provision that gives rise to a 180-day exclusivity right.
This right is extended to the first company to file a Paragraph IV
ANDA. Once such an ANDA filer receives this right, the FDA may not
approve any other ANDA for the same drug product until six months
after (1) the ANDA filer with the right first markets its product or
(2) a court decision declaring the patent at issue invalid or not infringed
on, whichever is sooner.'6 One remarkable consequence of this rule is
that if a first filer has not triggered its exclusivity period, say, because
it resolved its litigation with the brand-name company by agreeing not
to enter the market for several years, the brand-name company could
foreclose entry by later filers, even if they clearly did not infringe on
its patents, simply by not filing (and losing) an infringement suit.
Figure 5.1, taken from the FTC Generic Drug Study, outlines the rules
for Paragraph IV certification.
III.Summary of Enforcement Actions Involving Hatch-Waxman
Agreements
Hoechst -Andrx
Andrx was the first to file a Paragraph IV ANDA to market a generic
version of Hoechst's Cardizem CD and secured the 180-day exclusivity
right. Hoechst sued Andrx for patent infringement, triggering a thirty-
month stay of FDA approval of Andrx's product. Hoechst and Andrx
entered into an agreement that purported to settle a preliminary injunc-
tion in the infringement suit.
The Hoechst-Andrx agreement had four noteworthy provisions.
First, Andrx agreed not to market its generic product from July 1998
(when the thirty-month stay expired) until at least January 2000, when
Hoechst would allow Andrx to enter the market under a license to its
intellectual property. Andrx had the discretion (and was actually paid)
to stay off the market longer, until the patent suit was finally resolved.
Second, until Andrx marketed its product, Hoechst paid it $40 million
a year, starting in July 1998. If Andrx won the patent suit, Hoechst
would pay it another $60 million a year during the time it stayed offThe Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents 151
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Paragraph IV certifications,
Source: Figure 1-2 in Federal Trade Commission (2002).
the market, starting from July 1998. Third, Andrx agreed not to relin-
quish its 180-day exclusivity right to another ANDA filer, ensuring that
this right precluded other potential generic entrants from entering the
market.'7 Fourth, Andrx agreed not to market any generic version of
Cardizem CD, even products not at issue in the patent litigation with
Hoechst and regardless of whether the products did not infringe
Hoechst's patent.18
The FTC ified an administrative suit challenging the Hoechst-Andrx
agreement, alleging that the agreement as a whole, and in particular the
relinquishing and noninfringing restraints, constituted unreasonable
Patent holder sues generic applicant
within 45 days; trigger of automatic
thirty-month stay
Thirty-month stay expired; the
FDA may be able to approve
ANDA/\
For the first generic appticant,
the 180-day exclusivity period
begins upon marketing or court
decision, whichever comes first
Subsequent generic
applicants may be
approved only after the
first generic applicant's
180 days have expired.152 Bulow
restraints of trade in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. Shortly
before trial, Hoechst and Andrx settled with the FTC, individually
signing consent orders. These orders preclude both Hoechst and Andrx
from entering into (1) an agreement with either a relinquishing re-
straint or noninfringing restraint and (2) a partial settlement where a
generic manufacturer is paid to stay off the market (except if approved
by a court and with notice to the FTC).
Private plaintiffs filed suits in federal court, challenging the Hoechst-
Andrx agreement. The cases were consolidated in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The court [In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 682, 699 (E.D. Mich.
2000) (on appeal to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals)] granted the plain-
tiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, finding that the agreement
constituted a per se illegal market allocation:
On its face, the Agreement: (1) restrained Andrx from marketing its generic
version of Cardizem CD in July 1998 when FDA approval was expected and
obtained; (2) restrained Andrx from marketing other bioequivalent or generic
versions of Cardizem CD which were not at issue in the pending HMRI/Andrx
patent case,.. . and thus restrained Andrx from marketing non-infringing or
potentially non-infringing versions of Cardizem CD; and (3) restrained Andrx
from relinquishing or otherwise compromising its right to the 180-day period
of exclusivity it obtained under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. The HM/
Andrx Agreement thus inhibited rather than enhanced generic competition for
Cardizem CD and allocated the entire United States market for Cardizem CD
and its bioequivalents to HMRI during the life of the Agreement.
Abbott Geneva
Geneva was the first to file a Paragraph IV ANDA to market a generic
version of Abbott's Hytrin and was awarded the 180-day exclusivity
right. Abbott sued Geneva for patent infringement, triggering a thirty-
month stay of FDA approval of Geneva's product. The parties entered
into an agreement that purported to settle a preliminary injunction in
the patent litigation. Under the agreement, Geneva was precluded
from marketing its generic version of Hytrin until final resolution of
the patent litigation and, in return, was paid $54 million a year (for the
time it stayed off the market). Like the Hoechst-Andrx agreement, this
agreement also included a relinquishing restraint and a noninfringing
restraint.
Zenith also filed a Paragraph IV ANDA to market a generic version
of Hytrin. Zenith sued Abbott for wrongful patent listing in the FDA'sThe Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents 153
Orange Book, and Abbott counterclaimed, alleging patent infringe-
ment. The two parties fully settled their litigation. Under their settle-
ment, Abbott agreed to pay Zenith $6 million a quarter in return for
Zenith's agreeing not to market a generic version of Hytrin until the
expiration of Abbott's patents or until another generic version of Hy-
trin entered the market.
The FTC issued a complaint alleging that the Abbott-Geneva agree-
ment constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Sec-
tion 5 of the FTC Act. (The FTC did not challenge the Zenith
agreement.) Abbott and Geneva signed a consent order with the FTC
pursuant to which neither firm can enter into (1) an agreement with
a relinquishing restraint or a noninfringing restraint and (2) a partial
settlement in which a generic manufacturer is paid to stay off the mar-
ket (except if approved by a court and with notice to the FTC).
Private plaintiffs filed suits in federal court, challenging Abbott's
agreements with both Geneva and Zenith. As in Hoechst-Andrx, the
court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment,
finding that both agreements constituted per se illegal market al-
locations. [See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 164 F.
Supp. 2d 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (on appeal to the 11th Circuit Court of
Appeals).}
Schering-Upsher-Smith
Upsher-Smith was the first to file a Paragraph IV ANDA to market a
generic version of Schering's K-Dur 20 and was awarded the 180-day
exclusivity right. Schering sued Upsher-Smith for patent infringement,
alleging that Upsher-Smith's generic product infringed on a patent that
expired in 2006. On the eve of trial, in June 1997, Schering and Upsher-
Smith entered into an agreement that fully settled the parties' patent
litigation. Under the agreement, Upsher-Smith was precluded from
marketing any generic version of Schering's K-Dur 20 until September
2001. Also under the agreement, (1) Upsher-Smith was paid $60 million
and (2) they extended to Schering several licenses to products unre-
lated to K-Dur 20.
ESI Lederle also filed a Paragraph IV ANDA to market a generic ver-
sion of Schering's K-Dur 20 and was sued by Schering for patent in-
fringement. In January 1998, Schering and ESI settled their suit under
the following terms: ESI would not market its generic version of K-Dur
20 until January 2004 and would receive up to $15 million for staying154 Bulow
out of the market (arid another $15 million in return for extending to
Schering several licenses unrelated to K-Dur 20). The FTC challenged
Schering's agreements with Upsher-Smith and ESI Lederle. ESI settled
with the commission. Under the terms of this settlement, ESI cannot
enter into an agreement with a noninfringing restraint, nor can it enter
a full settlement in which a generic manufacturer is paid to stay out of
the market (except if approved by a court and with notice to the FTC).
The FTC filed an administrative complaint against Schering and
Upsher-Smith, challenging both of Schering's agreements under Sec-
tion 5 of the FTC Act. An administrative law judge found both of Scher-
ing's agreements lawful under the rule of reason. [See In the Matter of
Schering Plough Corp. et al, No. 9297, 2002 WL 1488085 (F.T.C. June 27,
2002) (on appeal to the Federal Trade Commission).] The AU reasoned
that the agreements should be analyzed under the rule of reason be-
cause both agreements had procompetitive aspects: (1) they provided
for generic market entry prior to the patent expiration date and (2) they
fully resolved patent litigation (Schering, pp. 97, 99-100). Tn addition,
the AU reasoned that the agreements were lawful under the rule of
reason because Schering's patent was presumed both valid and in-
fringed on and anticompetitive effects could not therefore be presumed
(Schering, pp. 100-101). The AU also found that Schering's $60 million
payments to Upsher-Smith were in consideration for licenses unrelated
to K-Dur 20 and not in return for Upsher-Smith's agreeing to stay off
the market.
Bristol-Schein
Tn August 1992, Schein filed a Paragraph IV ANDA with the FDA to
market a generic version of Bristol's BuSpar and was sued by Bristol for
patent infringement. In December 1994, Bristol and Schein fully settled
their litigation, under which Bristol paid Schein $72.5 million to abandon
its challenge to Bristol's patent (which required that Schein stay out of
the market until patent expiration). Bristol signed a consent decree with
the FTC, precluding it from entering into a patent settlement in which
an ANDA filer is paid and agrees not to market a generic product.
IV.Results of the FTC Generic Drug Study
In its 2002 Generic Drug Study, the FTC provided details on the his-
tory of Hatch-Waxman litigation and settlements. From 1984 throughThe Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents 155
December 31, 2001,483 ANDA filings involved 130 unique brand-name
drug products. The FTC study included ANDA filings made after Janu-
ary 1, 1992, which involved 104 products.
In twenty-nine cases (out of 104), the brand-name company (brand)
did not sue the first generic applicant.19 Of the remaining seventy-five
cases, twenty-two are still pending, with fifty-three resolved either
through litigation or settlement. Of the fifty-three, the brands won in
court eight times, with one case on appeal, and the generic companies
(generics) won twenty-two times, with four still on appeal. In two
cases, the patent expired before litigation was resolved, and in one
case, the NDA was withdrawn. In twenty cases, a settlement was
reached.
The FTC study included twenty final and four interim settlements.
In nine of the final settlements, the brand-name company agreed to
pay the generic. In seven of the twenty, the brand granted a license to
the generic. In two settlements, the generic was allowed to market the
brand's product as a generic product under the brand's NDA rather
than under the entrant's ANDA. A brief summary of sixteen of the
settlements is provided in tables in the FTC Generic Drug Study, and
they are reproduced here as tables 5.1 and 5.2. More details on some
of the cases are provided in the FTC study.
Of the settlements listed in table 5.1, the entry labeled E involved
marginal royalty rates above average rates and could be interpreted
as the equivalent of a deal that included a $9 million cash payment to
the generic. The other settlements were all structured as conventional
licensing agreements, with the generics paying an average licensing
fee that was at least as high as the marginal fee. As I will discuss below,
it is also conceivable that some of these other settlements may have
created competition problems because of their interaction with the 180-
day exclusivity law.
The settlements listed in table 5.2 are another matter entirely. In six
of the cases, it appears that the generic received cash and agreed to stay
out of the market until patent expiration, though in one case the re-
maining time was only four months. In the two other cases, generic entry
was substantially delayed, though it was to occur prior to patent expira-
tion. These eight agreements included additional conditions, for exam-
ple, restricting the generic from aiding any other generic applicant. FTC
employees regard such settlements as blatantly anticompetitive.
Brands also ified suits against forty-three second filers and reached
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payment. Finally, there were six agreements with generic entrants, four
of which focused on the 180-day exclusivity provision. In one case, the
second generic paid the first to waive exclusivity; in another, the first
relinquished its rights so that the second ANDA could be approved and
the first generic marketed the second generic's product. (The first ge-
neric's product was not ready for approval.) The FTC regarded all but
one of the agreements as procompetitive. It charged that the last agree-
ment unreasonably restrained competition between the entrants.2° I wifi
constrain the analysis to cases where there are no more than two poten-
tial entrants and not consider agreements between the two.
V.Economics and Game Theory Issues
In this section, I begin with a simple model of Paragraph IV settle-
ments, which we then use to illustrate the key economic and game
theory issues.
A Simple Model of Settlements Without the Thirty-Month and
180-Day Rules
We assume that there are two potential entrants into a contested patent
market. In the absence of any settlements, the first filer's case will be
resolved at time 0 and the patent will expire at time 1. A second filer's
case would be resolved at time R, 0 <R < 1.
All firms are risk-neutral and litigation costs are vanishingly small.21
For simplicity, I assume that the second filer will litigate its case. There
are four litigation possibilities involving whether the first or second
filer wins or loses its case. I define Pas the probability that both the
first and second filers will win their cases, PWL as the probability that
the first firm wins and the second firm loses, and so on. I assume that
the outcomes of the cases are at least weakly positively correlated,
so that Pww PLL > PWLPLW.
There will be two key variables in our analysis. The first is whether
the ratio of the benefit to a brand of excluding a sole generic entrant
to the cost of having a second entrant (which will be labeled B1 / B2) is
greater than or less than the ratio of the value to an entrant of being
the sole generic compared to the value of being one of two entrants
(which will be labeled C1 / G2). The second will be whether the actuari-
ally fair settlement date at a zero royalty with the first generic, S = PLW
+ PLL is greater than or less than R.160 Bulow
I assume thatB1 / B2; G1/ C2; and the ratio of consumer benefit de-
rived from the first and second entrants, CS1 / CS2, are all greater than
1. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume thatB1 /B2> CS1 / CS2?
I assume that the parties will reach a Nash bargaining solution, negoti-
ating only over a date for royalty-free entry.
In analyzing a settlement, it is useful to think that there are four
different possible types of days: monopoly days, triopoly days, and
duopoly days with either the first or second filer as the unique generic.
Because the second filer's entry is independent of any settlement with
the first filer, a settlement essentially involves either creating more tn-
opoly days, by the brand allowing the entrant to be in the market on
days when otherwise only the second generic would be selling, in re-
turn for the generic agreeing to stay out of the market on days when
it would have been the only generic, or vice versa. IfB1 /B2>G1/ G2,
then the parties will want to design settlements that include more mo-
nopoly and triopoly days; if it does not, they will prefer a settlement
with fewer monopoly/triopoly and more duopoly days.
There are four relevant cases:
S <R and the ratio assumption B1/B2> G1/G2 holds. In this case,
an actuarially fair settlement will automatically increase the expected
number of monopoly days to 5, from S - (1 - R)PLW. Because the sec-
ond filer's entry is unaffected, the actuarially fair settlement must cre-
ate the same number of monopoly days (benefiting the brand) as
triopoly days (benefiting the generic). This would be a very profitable
deal for the brand but unprofitable for the generic, so an actual settle-
ment would have to be restructured to make the generic better off. This
would be done through a settlement date that would be earlier than
the actuarially fair date, thereby reducing the number of expected days
acting as the exclusive entrant that the generic would be sacrificing to
become at least a triopolist after the second filer's litigation is resolved.
In the end, the settlement would be an agreement to trade off the cre-
ation of monopoly and triopoly days at a rate somewhere between
B1/B2and G1/G2.
Whether consumers gain from the settlement depends on whether
the ratio of additional created tniopoly days to new created monopoly
days exceeds CS1 / CS2. If G1 / C2 > CS1 / CS2, then consumers will
surely gain; if not, consumers may or may not come out ahead.23
S > R and the ratio assumption holds. If there is a low correlation
between the brand and the entrant winning their cases, then the sameThe Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents 161
results as case 1 apply: mutually profitable settlements would be actu-
arially early and likely benefit consumers. But if there is a high or perfect
correlation in the outcomes of the cases, then a delayed entry settlement
would not be feasible. The problem, illustrated neatly by a perfect corre-
lation in litigation outcomes, is that without settlement there will never
be a day in which the second filer would be the only entrant, but with
a settlement, there would be S - R days after the second filer's case
was resolved but before the first filer's settlement came into effect, and
the second filer might be the only generic. As discussed in case 1, the
focus of a settlement would be to eliminate such days, so settlements
would provide losses rather than gains.24
S <R and the ratio assumption is reversed. In this case, the objective
of any settlement would be to make a trade that turned monopoly and
triopoly days into duopoly days. But as shown in case 1, a settlement
will increase the number of monopoly days. So a settlement would not
be mutually profitable for the parties.
S > R and the ratio assumption is reversed. Now the viability of a
settlement depends on the correlation of litigation outcomes. With no
correlation, a settlement for a date of certain entry would necessarily
increase the number of monopoly days and not be viable. If the out-
comes were highly positively correlated, however, the noncontingent
entry of the first filer on a date after R would create some potential
duopoly days and therefore be profitable for the firms. Since consumers
always have a relatively high value for the second entrant relative to
the brand, however, settlements of this sort, which would lead to entry
after the actuarially fair date, would reduce consumer surplus.
Which case is most likely? Empiricists have often modeled generic
competition as similar to Cournot competition with linear demand,
with overall market size independent of generic entry.26 In this case,
the ratio assumption is likely to hold, settlements are viable without
any subsidies, and consumers will benefit from a settlement, provided
that the settlement does not affect the timing of subsequent entry (cases
1 and 2). Tn other cases, however, settlements with noncontingent entry
dates will not be viable without a subsidy (case 3), or settlements may
even reduce welfare (case 4).
Whether risk aversion would act in favor of earlier or later entry
would depend on both the risk preferences of the parties and the rela-
tive amount of money they have at stake. If the generic is owned by
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cause the brand has much more money at stake, it would be relatively
more eager for a settlement if the two parties are risk-averse, and this
situation would help both the generic and consumers.27 Of course, ba-
sic capital market theory would say that if the litigation risk is nonsys-
tematic and the firms' managers act as fiduciaries for well-diversified
stockholders, then the firms should be risk-neutral regarding the
litigation.
As an empirical matter, risk aversion should not be terribly relevant
in most cases. The market values of the large pharmaceutical compa-
nies (pharmas) are enormous relative to the amount at stake in most
of these cases, even if the absolute dollars may be in the hundreds of
millions. The point is illustrated in the next section in a discussion of
the Schering-Upshur settlement.
Similarly, one might consider a settlement that gives the entrant an
immediate license at a constant marginal royalty rate. In this way, the
consumer pays more than if the license is royalty-free but gets the bene-
fits of a generic for a longer period of time. In most models of competi-
tion between undifferentiated products and firms with equal marginal
costs, this kind of settlement would seem to be better for consumers.
Small reductions in price from the monopoly level, as created by entry
with high royalty costs, cause small drops in profits but first-order
gains in consumer savings. Since the entrant's gain is likely to be
roughly proportional to the incumbent's loss,28 it follows that settle-
ments that allow entry sooner, albeit at somewhat higher prices, would
be better for consumers. On the other hand, economies of scale might
make delayed entry with a royalty-free license both more efficient and
better for consumers.29
Introducing litigation costs into the analysis should make settle-
ments less favorable to consumers. Because the pharmas have so much
more money at stake than the generics, the relative cost of litigation to
the cost of settlement is lower for them, so standard models would
predict that they would be less willing to achieve a settlement. For
example, a Nash bargaining solution would imply that if the brand
has three times as much money at stake as the generic, then litigation
costs would benefit the brand in settlement negotiations as long as the
cost of presenting its case is not more than three times as high as the
generic's cost. One usually does not think of the high cost of litigation
as a strategic benefit for small companies in battles with big ones.
The conclusion is that the results in the basic case with risk-neutral
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side payments might not always be feasible when I abstract from the
special Hatch-Waxman rules, when they are, it is reasonably likely
though not certain that they will be pro-competitive. However, in the
cases where a subsidy is required to make a settlement feasible, as
when the ratio assumption is reversed, the settlement that results
would likely harm consumers.
The 180-Day Rule
The existence of the 180-day rule obviously acts to the detriment of
second entrants, even more so if there are settlements with the first
filer, and especially if there is likely to be a correlation in the litigation
results. First, consider the case where litigation is uncorrelated, but a
second entrant cannot enter the market until some time (e.g., 180 days)
after the first entrant. If the first entrant loses its case, however, then
the second entrant can enter immediately on winning. Now the pri-
vate, as opposed to the social, incentives for settlement are much more
compelling. The extreme gaming situation occurs when the second
entrant's case is relatively strong and the first entrant's case is rel-
atively weak. Then the optimal solution for the brand-name company
and the entrant might be to negotiate a settlement allowing the en-
trant to come in 180 days or even less before the patent expires. The
brand-name company could then avoid suing the second entrant,
which would then not be allowed to enter until the end of the patent's
life. It would make sense to sue the second entrant only if it had a weak
enough case that the expected benefits from defeating it in court, and
thereby eliminating it as a second entrant, were great enough to com-
pensate for possibly losing the case and causing the 180-day clock
to start at R, rather than at the entry time negotiated with the first
entrant.
The 180-day rule was put in place as an incentive for generics to
become first filers, at a time when few patents were challenged.3° Put-
ting aside for the moment the merits of the rule as originally intended,
the rule as currently interpreted creates significant gaming opportuni-
ties. As I will discuss in Section VII, one possible modification would
be to require any settlement to include a forfeiture of the exclusivity
period. This requirement would eliminate the ability to lock out second
entrants without a lawsuit and take away the incentive to settle a risky
litigation for a delayed entry date because doing so would guarantee
the 180 days.164 Bulow
The Thirty-Month Rule
The most obvious problem with the thirty-month rule is that, because
the FDA does not monitor Orange Book listings, a generic caimot enter
a market earlier even if the brand's patent claim were not strong
enough to persuade a judge to grant a stay against the generic's entry.
If the patents in question concerned the brand's new chemical entity,
this would be less of an issue: litigation would typically take about
thirty months anyway, and even without litigation it would take a cou-
ple of years on average for an ANDA to be approved. Finally, the rule
could be interpreted as being a roundabout way of granting a new
chemical entity seven and a half years of exclusivity rather than five.
But many of the challenged patents do not concern the new chemical
entity, and recently, as brands have filed more and more patents, litiga-
tion has often extended well beyond thirty months. Firms are allowed
to add additional patents to the Orange Book at any time, and one way
that brands have gamed the system is to list additional patents when
the generic's initial litigation is well advanced. Brands have filed meta-
bolic patents,31 polymorph patents,32 and process patents33 in the Or-
ange Book. Because the FDA does not monitor Orange Book listings,
these patents can be listed even if there is little chance that it is relevant
to the patent litigation. Indeed, some brands have engaged in "double
patenting": listing two essentially identical patents that expire on the
same day at two different times,35 with the only net effect being to force
a restart of the thirty-month clock.
This ability to extend litigation, even when the later filed patent
is of questionable value, obviously postpones legitimate entry. For
example, the first ANDA for Paxil was filed in March 1998, and
GlaxoSmithKline'sfifth thirty-month stay is scheduled to expire in Sep-
tember 2003. Furthermore, the threat of such filings will harm the abil-
ity of a generic to obtain a fair settlement of its claims.
One additional factor is likely to make settlements a bit worse for
both second entrants and consumers. That is, a Paragraph IV filing can
be made based on patent noninfringement, invalidity, or both. If the
first filer wins its litigation based on invalidity, a second entrant will
automatically be able to enter the market after 180 days and will no
longer have to litigate. In a settlement, it will be in the interest of
both the first entrant and the brand to maintain that the patent is valid,
requiring the second entrant to litigate and face the thirty-month
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Shared Exclusivity
One of the technical problems that the Food and Drug Administration
has had to deal with in a world with multiple Orange Book listings
made over time on the same medicine is what to do when different
generics are the first to file on different patents. For example, Aiidrx
and Genpharm were the first to file on different patents regarding Pri-
losec (omeprazole).36 By October 2001, there were no thirty-month stays
barring entry, and AstraZeneca had acknowledged that the Andrx and
Genpharm products did not infringe on the remaining unexpired pat-
ents. The dilemma for the FDA was that the law could be read as saying
that Andrx could not enter and begin its exclusivity until after Gen-
pharm's exclusivity had expired, and vice versa. So having the two ge-
nerics meant that perhaps neither could enter.
The FDA debated between a one-first-applicant rule, which would
give exclusivity to the first filer against any patent, or a shared-exclusiv-
ity rule, which would allow all the first filers in at the same time, to the
exclusion of other generic firms. The decision was to go with the shared-
exclusivity approach as being more consistent with the statutory lan-
guage. While this decision meant that no generic would really have full
exclusivity in these situations, it was felt that the 180-day rule did not
guarantee a period of exclusivity for two other significant reasons as
well. A district court decision could trigger the start of the exclusivity
period before the ANDA was approved, and if the generic could not be
sufficiently confident of winning the appeals case, it might prudently
not enter, even though its exclusivity period would be running.
VI.Problematic Settlements
While the 180-day and thirty-month rules create numerous problems
for competition, there have been several settlements where the brand
and first filing entrant have agreed to settle their disputes in ways that
would raise flags, even in the absence of these rules, because of the
way brands have used the system. The key types of settlements are
discussed below.
Cash Side Deals
Settlements where the brand-name company pays the entrant cash as
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flags. While arm's length deals with no cash changing hands can be
procompetitive (though they are less likely to be so because of the 180-
day rule), adding cash to the deal cannot be. Simply compare the settle-
ment that would be made in the absence of a $50 million transfer from
the brand to the generic, with the settlement made with the cash pay-
ment. It is clear that in return for the cash, the entrant will agree to
come to market later. The consumer clearly loses from this partof the
deal.
As a numerical example, consider a case with one potential entrant.
The entrant has a 50-50 chance of winning its case. If it enters, it will
earn $100 million, while the brand's profits will be reduced by $300
million. Both sides are risk-neutral, litigation costs are negligible, and
the parties negotiate a Nash bargaining solution. Without a cash side
payment, the entrant would be allowed to come in halfway through
the remaining patent life. The brand would lose $150 million, the en-
trant would gain $50 million, and consumers would pay about $100
million less for their medicines. But if cash payments are allowed, then
the solution is for the brand to pay the entrant $75 million to stay out
of the market until the patent expiration. That would give both the
brand and the generic three-fourths of their expected profit from win-
ning the litigation. The problem is that this comes at the expense of
consumers losing their expected savings.
One response from parties has been that a deal was simply not feasi-
ble without a cash payment (say, in our earlier example, that the ratio
assumption did not hold). The argument has to be that no efficient
settlement would benefit both parties because consumers would get
more than 100 percent of the benefits. But stating that any possible deal
would be unprofitable to either one or both parties, but for allowing
the brand to purchase some extra monopoly time, puts a limit on how
efficient the deal must have been without the cash. Perhaps one can
argue that sometimes marginally efficient deals don't get done because
of bargaining breakdowns, but if the deal was only marginally efficient,
then there is the issue of whether such deals are worth subsidizing at
the cost of departing from one of the most basic antitrust principles:
you don't get to pay your competitor to stay out of yourmarket. Cer-
tairily the authorities would never permit a merger that would not get
done but for an explicitly anticompetitive element. Furthermore,
allowing the subsidization of these deals through the purchase of addi-
tional monopoly time would mean that some deals that were inefficient
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A second argument is that allowing brands to buy settlements is a
way of expanding the patent life on drugs. In equilibrium, allowing
this behavior will lead to more intense competition in the development
of new pharmaceuticals. It is entirely possible that increasing the exclu-
sivity rights and patent lengths of pioneer pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers would be good social policy, but the point here is that, regardless
of whether that is true, it is efficient policy to differentiate between
patents that are valid and those that are not. If we allow buyoffs, we
are effectively permitting the drug companies to convert all patent
claims, valid or not, into extended monopolies. Welfare is increased if
we allow those with legitimate patents to have longer monopolies than
those without, thereby enabling longer exclusivity for legitimate pat-
ents at any given total cost.
Third, risk aversion and litigation costs might make settlements effi-
cient, and public policy is to encourage settlement of legal disputes.
This is true, but the risk-aversion argument applies to the settlement
that would occur without the incremental payment for extra monopoly
time. The brand's risk of generic entry, and the generic's similar risk,
is resolved by a deal without cash payments. The postponement of
the entry time due to a cash payment does not eliminate risk, again
unless the deal were so marginal that it would not have been done
otherwise.
Furthermore, any serious analysis of the risk-aversion issue would
imply that it should have little empirical bearing on all but the very
largest settlements. Consider Schering-Upshur-Smith. Schering paid
$60 million before taxes. Assuming a 3-to-i ratio in Schering's margins
to Upshur-Smith's and ignoring any anticompetitive side effects on the
deal regarding other potential entrants, the side payments purchased
something between $60 and $i80 million of pretax monopoly profits,
significantly less after taxes. Schering's market value is about $25 bil-
lion. Even if the company's management were risk-averse with regard
to the settlement, the discount for risk aversion for a bet representing
less than 1/2 percent of the company's value should have been excep-
tionally small.37 Also, if Schering were risk-averse, it could have re-
duced risk at no sacrifice in fair market value by, say, hedging out
pension liabilities with bonds rather than ploughing pension assets into
stocksso why settle a case at less than fair market value?38
Finally, companies have argued to the FTC that the informational
asymmetries between the brands and generics make it more difficult
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allow some subsidy through the purchase of additional monopoly time
to "grease" the deal.39 Two kinds of asymmetries that cover the basic
cases are (1) the entrant has better information than the brand-name
company about whether it has a viable product to sell, and (2) the
brand-name company has better information than the entrant about
whether it has a substitute product in the pipeline that will reduce the
value of deferred entry.
But this justification for the deals would imply endorsing major de-
partures from standard antitrust policy to facilitate some marginally
efficient (as well as some marginally inefficient) deals. Beyond that, it
is not clear why the appropriate way to resolve these uncertainties is
by cash payments from the brand to the generic for extra monopoly
time. For example, if the entrant is better informed about the time that
its product will be ready, it could signal this by offering to pay the
brand a license fee for earlier entry. There are no competitive problems
with cash transfers that go the "right way." Another acceptable solu-
tion would be for the generic to offer to buy a license with a high roy-
alty rate for the last years and a low rate for the first years. This offer
would signal that it does have a viable product that will be ready
sooner rather than later. In the case where the brand has better informa-
tion about when a substitute product is likely to diminish the market
for the current medicine, it can similarly negotiate a settlement that
allows for earlier entry in return for high royalty payments on all sales
made after a certain date. This solution would effectively signal to the
generic that the brand did not expect a substitute to take over the mar-
ket any time soon.
A final argument that was made to the FTC was that, in some cases,
the generic claimed it did not in fact have a legitimate product ready
to sell, so any cash it could receive from the brand for delayed entry
would not have any adverse effect on the consumer. Put aside the dif-
ficulty, on the FTC's part, of evaluating the remarks of a party that
claims to have misrepresented itself in the settlement negotiations.
Consider the consequence of having a rule saying that cash settlements
were to be allowed only in cases where the entrant in fact had no ability
to enter. Why would a brand make a cash payment under such a rule?
Therefore, such a rule would appear to be the equivalent of a rule that
simply prohibited all cash payments. In a civil litigation, where dam-
ages to consumers from a settlement are at issue, the fact that the ge-
neric did not have a product to sell would be relevant.The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents 169
Cash Payments Until the Resolution of Litigation
In the Hoechst-Andrx case, Hoechst agreed to make quarterly pay-
ments to Andrx in return for Andrx staying out of the market after the
automatic thirty-month stay expired and until its litigation was re-
solved.40 There are good reasons why a generic might choose to stay
out of a market until litigation is resolved. If it enters, it will be liable
for damages equal to the lost profits of the brand.41 But that stipulation
does not require allowing for payments to the generic. There are also
good reasons why a brand might request a stay against a generic's
entry, especially if it feels that it has a good case and the generic is
unlikely to have the money to pay a damage claim. But the thirty-
month rule does not preclude the brand from going to court to extend
the stay. The only reason to purchase a stay is to guard against
the possibility that a court would refuse to grant one and the generic
would come to market, and in that circumstance we would not allow
a payment.
Finally, payments as structured by Hoechst-Andrx, in which the
amount paid to the generic is increasing the length of the litigation
rather than a lump sum, give generics an additional incentive to delay
entry. The reason is that the payment structure can create an incentive
for the generic to drag out the litigation, particularly if either (1) it is
likely that it will lose, or (2) there is a second generic who will likely
be able to enter after 180 days, regardless of when the litigation is
resolved.
Complex Side Deals
Understanding that pure cash payments would present an antitrust
problem, some firms have attempted the following structure. The ge-
neric agrees to delayed entry, the brand-name company provides the
entrant with cash, and the entrant provides the brand with some other
consideration, such as licenses to patents that the generics hold. This
was the basic structure of the Schering-Upshur-Smith deal that the FTC
challenged.
Part and parcel of the argument here must be that additional issues
will make the larger settlement possible. For example, assume that
A and B each own an asset. A is known to have a value of between 50
and 100 for asset 1, which it owns, and a value that is $10 higher for170 Bulow
asset 2, which B owns. B is known to have a value of something between
60 and 110 for asset 1, and a value that is $10 lower for asset 2. If there
are separate negotiations over the two assets, economic theory tells us
that the marginally efficient deals will not get done.So it is possible
that A wifi not sell to B even when it is somewhat efficient to do so, and
vice versa. But it is easy to see that if the two deals are put together, A
and B can agree to swap assets, making each one better off by $10.
But the real-world transactions with complex side deals appeared to
many economists and attorneys at the FTC to be mere fig leafs for cash
payments. For example, in the Schering case, (1) the due diligence on
the Schering side prior to the purchase of the patents could charitably
be described as minimal; (2) there were no significant alternative offers
for the patents, let alone alternatives that were comparable to the Scher-
ing offer; (3) other rights offered by other firms, which appeared to be
more valuable than those offered by Upshur-Smith, were rejected by
Schering at much lower prices; and (4) in confirmation, the rights pur-
chased turned out to be worth very, very little. Indeed, some have re-
ferred to the licenses that Schering "purchased" as being for "Brooklyn
Bridgeizone."
The decision in the FTC case contains the administrative law judge's
arguments against all these claims He also relied on the bargaining
argument that sometimes the introduction of additional issues into the
mix helps facilitate efficient trade.
There are two problems here. First, I believe that the FTC's skepti-
cism over the value to Schering of the patent rights Schering purchased
was well justified. But second, and more important, whether the value
to Schering matched its cost was not the right question. To see why, con-
sider the following example. Assume that a bundle of patent rights
owned by the generic is worth 10 to the generic, perhaps as the best
alternative price it can receive from another buyer, and 90 to the brand-
name company. Also assume these values are easily observed and veri-
fied by everyone. In an arm's length transaction involving the sale of
those rights, the price might be 50, or well above the value to the ge-
neric. Such a deal would surely happen, regardless of whether there
is a separate transaction involving a Paragraph IV filing.
Now imagine that it is bundled in with the Hatch-Waxman case. The
incentive of the parties would be to make the price of the right to the
patent as high as they could get away with, or to something close to
90 in the example if the Schering judge's arguments are accepted, and
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bundling of a second, irrelevant deal has become a vehicle for allowing
the cash payment of 40 to acquire delayed entry. This problem is exac-
erbated because the regulatory agencies are at a tremendous informa-
tional disadvantage in evaluating not only the probability that a patent
litigation would be successful but the value of any side deal, in the
absence of clear market alternatives.In any event, economists (in con-
trast to the Schering Upshur AU) would tend to be skeptical of claims
that one firm would have a value for a set of licenses that was a large
multiple of the value to the second highest alternative when an indus-
try with as many competitors as pharmaceuticals.
Note that protecting against the abusive potential of a Schering-type
deal would not require a prohibition against a brand purchasing addi-
tional licenses from a generic as part of a bundled deal that included
a Hatch-Waxman settlement. Rather, the necessary requirement to
eliminate gaming possibilities would be that the cash paid by a brand
in any deal be clearly no higher than what it could have received by
selling the extra licenses separately. The parties can then adjust on the
margin by shortening the monopoly to achieve the multi-issue bar-
gaining efficiencies that are the efficiency justification for bundling the
transactions, rather than increasing it. If the deal falls apart (unless
there is a way to buy an extension of the monopoly), then the implica-
tion is that the deal did not create substantial efficiencies in the first
place. This is especially true given the ambiguous welfare effects of
settlements in this area, in light of the 180-day rule.
Again, I emphasize that there is no need to rule out all side deals to
eliminate the potential for gaming. For example, generics could include
cash or free licenses in a settlement package, and indeed many settle-
ments of patent disputes have involved payments from the generics
to the brands." If a generic had a set of licenses for which it had an
alternative offer of 20, then including the licenses for a charge of 15
would be procompetitive. The standard that would ensure that a side
deal does not reduce welfare is that the generic would at least weakly
prefer to have the total side deal eliminated, were that possible with
the Hatch-Waxman deal still getting done on the same terms.
Royalty Payments
Some deals have involved entrants receiving licenses to enter the mar-
ket, either immediately or on a delayed basis, with the entrant paying
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whether such settlements are procompetitive depends primarily on the
shape of the royalty schedule. In the extreme, a fixed one-time payment
from the entrant is presumably made to speed entry. A constant mar-
ginal royalty rate is presumably also agreed to by the generic as a way
of getting into the market sooner. But a royalty rate that increases with
quantity sold (for example, 10 cents a pill for the first 100 million pills
and 50 cents thereafter) shares important traits with a cash payment
to the entrant. In the example, if the entrant sells more than 100 million
pills, its situation is the same as if it paid a constant royalty plus re-
ceived a payment of $40 million. Presumably the entrant would have
negotiated other terms that would have allowed it to enter sooner or
at a lower marginal cost were it not receiving the cash.
Gaming the System with Pseudo-Generics
One final device that has been used to game the system involves the
licensing of pseudo-generics in settlements. A pseudo-generic is the
branded drug sold as a generic under license from the brand. One ex-
ample is the settlement between AstraZeneca and Barr labs over tamox-
ifen, the most widely prescribed breast cancer drug. Barr, whose CEO
is a trial lawyer, was the first filer. It claimed that its license to sell
tamoxifen did not trigger its 180-day exclusivity period. Therefore, it
claimed that no other generic should be allowed to enter until the expi-
ration of the patent, unless it was first sued by AstraZeneca, then won
its case, then waited 180 days. To add to the insult, the deal limited
Barr to charging 5 percent less than Zeneca's brand-name Nolvadex.
The Barr position was initially upheld but was overturned on appeal.
As Federal District Judge Ricardo Urbina perceptively observed,
"Hatch-Waxman intended to provide an incentive for drug companies
to explore new drugs, not a market 'windfall' for crafty, albeit industri-
ous market players."46
In a 2001 settlement, Pfizer similarly agreed to give Mylan a license
to sell a generic version of Procardia XL 30 as settlement of its litigation.
In this case, the FDA subsequently required Mylan to change its ANDA
application to a Paragraph III filing on the grounds that the settlement
implied that the patent was valid and Mylan was not contesting it. In
this way the FDA managed to prevent the settlement from blocking
other potential generic entrants.
From a game theoretic perspective, it is easy to see how pseudo-
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Hatch-Waxman settlement. Some deterrence tactics may be legal, oth-
ers not. Clearly, though, the introduction of a competing pseudo-
generic will reduce the profits of any generic that wins a Paragraph
IV case (or plans to enter after patent expiration), especially since the
pseudo-generic will be a perfect substitute for the brand and it may be
brought to market before the generic. Even in cases where the pseudo-
generic's impact on the brand's profits may be ambiguous, it will at
least serve to enhance a reputation of the brand-name company that
it will make challenging its patents as unprofitable as possible. As an
example, in April 2003, GlaxoSmithKline submitted a proposed settle-
ment of a Paxil infringement suit with Pentech, one of the later filers.
While the agreement has not been made public, it apparently may li-
cense Pentech to sell a pseudo-generic Paxil whenever Apotex, the first
filer, finally is approved.
VII.Policy Issues
In this section, I discuss proposals for changing Hatch-Waxman, largely
focusing on the elimination of the current gaming incentives.
Revising or Eliminating the Thirtj-Month Rule
If an entrant loses a patent infringement case, it is liable for damages
that it causes the patent holder. The patent holder might legitimately
request a preliminary injunction (P1) that would either deny entry or
require the entrant to put up a bond against potential damages. if the law
did not allow for PIs, a judgment-proof entrant could unfairly damage a
patent holder. The entrant might be able to force the patent holder to
pay it for not entering or, if the FTC prohibited that option on antitrust
grounds, it might be able to force the patent holder to allow it to enter
the market some time before the legitimate expiration of the patent.
It seems fair that patent holders be given notice of the intent of a
generics manufacturer to infringe on one of their patents, and that they
have time to request a preliminary injunction. The current notice pro-
visions and the forty-five-day rule seem adequate, especially because
it takes a considerable amount of time for an ANDA to be approved,
thus allowing the incumbent time to get a PT. But if the brand can get
a stay against entry whenever a judge believes that it is appropriate,
one might question the necessity of having the automatic thirty-month
stay and all the gaming that it implies.174 Bulow
One argument of the advocates of the current rules is that the thirty-
month stay was part of a complex bargain that included the intro-
duction of ANDAs and changes to the rules regarding patent life.
Maintaining incentives for pharmaceutical R&D might therefore re-
quire accompanying the elimination of the thirty-month stay with a
change in patent life. Perhaps so, but it is unclear what the thirty-month
stay does, beyond saving the trouble of filing for a P1, if a patent holder
does not use it to game the system. Even without a PT, a generics firm
would not enter a market before a verdict unless either (1) it really is
judgment-proof or (2) it has reason to be extremely confident of win-
ning its case. The thirty-month rule has an effect only when a patent
holder is unable to obtain a PT because its case is not strong enough,
or when it is gaming the system with sequential filings. It is hard to
imagine that the legislative bargain that produced the thirty-month
rule was meant to cover those cases. That said, because of the thirty-
month stay, patented new chemical entities are currently effectively
guaranteed for up to seven and a half instead of five years of exclusiv-
ity. It is possible, if the thirty-month stay rule were eliminated, Con-
gress might reasonably choose to extend the exclusivity period of new
chemical entities.
The FTC has proposed limiting brands to one thirty-month stay per
new chemical entity. Given that the average length of litigation (when
there is only one stay) is over two years and it is unlikely in most cases
that a generic would enter the market until it was reasonably confident
of a legal victory, such a proposal would cause little delay in entry,
assuming that brands would generally be able to obtain a stay.47
In June 2003, the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee
of the Senate approved a one thirty-month stay limit in the pro-
posed S.1225 Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals (GAAP) by
a vote of 21-0. In addition, if a generic is not sued within forty-five
days of brand notification, it would be beneficial to allow it to sue to
obtain affirmation that it is noninfringing. GAAP also includes this
provision.
Revising the 180-Day Rule
Several thoughtful analysts have proposed either elimination or revision
of the 180-day rule. Under the McCain-Schumer Greater Access to Af-
fordable Pharmaceuticals Act,49 the exclusivity of the first filer would
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ure to get tentative product approval within thirty months, failure to
win the lawsuit, or the settlement of a lawsuit with the brand-name com-
pany that acknowledged patent validity. Reform in the rule is clearly
essential; the real question may be, Can the rule be justified at all?
The justification for the 180-day rule must be to give entrants a fair
share of the value that their entry creates. That is, it must imply some
market imperfection that would cause the volume of entry to be too
low without the provision. Typically, economists would argue that an
entrant to a market should be rewarded on the basis of the value it
creates. Value is generally thought of as the sum of the profits of the
existing firms and the benefits that consumers reap from the market.
Within antitrust law, consumer benefits are given much greater weight
than are profits. An entrant who can create a new product that is supe-
rior to the old, or who can produce an old product more cheaply than
anyone else, will be able to benefit in proportion to the degree to which
its products are superior to those already in the market. But with ge-
neric drugs, the benefit that the entrant provides is somewhat different:
it is competition.
No one thinks of the generic product as superior to the brand-name
product. At the very best, it is identical. It is exceedingly unlikely that
a generics firm will have lower production costs than the brand-name
firm that has been selling a medicine for years. What the generic pro-
vides, then, is competition. Consumers will benefit by being able to
buy a bioequivalent substitute at a reduced price. The lower price may
increase efficiency by bringing in new customers who would otherwise
be priced out of the market, and similarly by causing competitors to
lower their prices and also bring in new customers. But the reality is
that these efficiencies are probably not primary. What the generics
really contribute to efficiency is to make the patent system work as
Congress intends. Developers of good patents are appropriately re-
warded for the appropriate length of time, while those whose claims
are invalid are not so rewarded. It is less costly for the government to
award long patents as an incentive for legitimate innovation if it is less
concerned that doing so will also allow long periods of exclusivity to
those who did not develop a valid patent
One problem with the current system is that it rewards entrants
based on filing date, not on actual contribution. The entrant who has
really contributed something is the one who wins the litigation that
makes entry feasible, not the first firm to file. Consistent with the con-
cept that firms should be rewarded for what they contribute, any exclu-176 Bulow
sivity period would most efficiently be granted to the first firm to make
entry feasible. Such a change would go a long way to eliminating the
gaming possibilities available under the current law because agreements
by one firm could no longer be used to postpone entry by a second.
However, there is still the issue of whether the 180-day exclusivity
period is at all justifiable. The argument against it is that it is not avail-
able in other industries, so the only reason to make it available in phar-
maceuticals is that the industry is somehow different. The response is
two-part. First, what is the justification for an exclusivity period? Sec-
ond, what is it about pharmaceuticals that might be different from
other industries in which there are patent contests?
The justifications for the exclusivity period derive from the time and
costs of the legal system. If the legal system could provide an instanta-
neous and cost-free resolution of all patent disputes, then any generic
entrant could enter the market as soon as it had a product that did not
use any valid patents. It would be the exclusive generic until a second
generic firm came along with a similar product. Assuming that the
entrance of the first firm neither speeds nor slows the entrance of the
second firm, then the first firm would have exclusivity for exactly
the period by which it speeded generic entry to the market. Its entry
would provide benefits for both the firm and consumers.
But if the legal system is costly and time consuming, then problems
arise. Assume that it takes eighteen months and several million dollars
to litigate a patent case. Generic A develops its product twelve months
before generic B. At the end of eighteen months, A wins its litigation
and the patent is declared invalid. If A and B were able to enter the
market on the same day, A would make very little money, and get
little compensation, for its contribution in speeding generic entry by a
year and saving B a year's worth of litigation expense.
Were the verdict for A noninfringement, then the argument is more
complex. If A's victory did not speed B's entry or save B litigation ex-
pense, then there would be no justification for guaranteeing a mini-
mum of 180 days of exclusivity. But if, for example, A's victory enabled
B to predict victory confidently and overturn a preliminary injunction
against its entry, then A's victory would speed B's entry into the mar-
ket, perhaps leaving A with little to show for its efforts. Similarly, if
A were well ahead of B in development but a judge consolidated A's
and B's litigation, then the resolution of B's case might be speeded
by A's actions, depriving A from benefiting from its contribution of
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One caveat noted by Engelberg (1999) is that the generics business
has evolved greatly since the Hatch-Waxman Act. Now, generics are
likely to have patent lawyers routinely screening Orange Book listings.
When a questionable patent is filed, several generics often will invest
in the six to twelve months of data needed to file an ANDA, almost
simultaneously. In such cases, the 180-day rule gives the first filer more
exclusivity than its marginal social contribution to early entry.51
Beyond this, there remains the question of whether this problem,
namely, that the litigation process may deprive a successful generic of
some of the benefits of its contribution, is sufficient to merit special
rules. Couldn't the same argument be made in other types of patent
litigation? No one is proposing a 180-day rule in those markets.
Pharmaceuticals may well be different. The difference has to do with
the sort of products that generic manufacturers sell. The goal of a ge-
neric is to produce as perfect a substitute for a brand-name drug as
possible, and any other users of the patent would attempt the same.52
In other sectors, potential users of the patent may be nonrivalrous, or
at least may produce highly differentiated goods. In other patent cases,
the dispute is very likely to be quite different. For example, high-tech
companies that engage in patent cross-licensing are likely to be produc-
ing products that do not directly compete with each other. While AMD
and Intel compete directly, their products still differ, and most of the
firms that license Intel's patents, or whose patents Intel licenses, pro-
duce products that are quite different from Intel's. Pharmaceuticals are
unusual because the entrant proposes to clone as closely as possible a
final product sold directly by the patent holder. In other markets, dis-
putes may be about patents that represent a relatively small fraction
of the value of the user's product, for example, a patent on windshield
wiper technology that a car manufacturer might wish to use, or a tech-
nology for producing clean gasoline. In generic drugs, however, the
patent represents almost the entire value of the product.
Of course, this analysis is highly speculative. It merely means to sug-
gest that there may be a reason why the incentives for potential en-
trants in pharmaceutical cases would be less under the conventional
patent litigation system than they are in other industries. A guaranteed
exclusivity period for the first firm to win its litigation might thus be
appropriate, if its litigation is likely to speed entry by competitors.
Whether 180 days is the right number is an empirical matter. Roughly,
the questions are: How much of a lead would the first victorious liti-
gant have if its litigation had no effect on the entry date of other firms?178 Bulow
How much of a lead is it likely to have in the real world where its
litigation does affect competitors' entry? And how much of an exclusiv-
ity period would be needed to restore the appropriate entry lead?
With an average of approximately four filers per patent, the 180-day
exclusivity has certainly helped to attract many generic firms, but the
alternative inference is that exclusivity is no longer warranted. Welfare
would be increased by requiring the forfeiture of any right to 180-day
exclusivity by any firm that agrees to a delayed entry settlement. The
justification given above for retaining the exclusivity is that a litigation
victory by A might speed B's entry into the market, and so A would
not be adequately compensated for its work as the first filer. If A settles
its litigation with no acknowledgment of patent noninfringement or in-
validity, then it has arguably not speeded B's entry into the market. In
this case, B might still be eligible for some exclusivity, up to 180 days,
if it won its case prior to the date at which A was scheduled to enter
the market, subject to its exclusivity not deferring A's date of entry.
As to when the 180 days would begin, the FTC study argues that it
should start after the first legal decision, even if the case is appealed
and the firm does not enter. This is the current interpretation of the
law. There are legitimate reasons for not entering until an unappealable
verdict is reached, so a rule of starting the clock on entry or on winning
a final verdict, which was the FDA's original interpretation of the law,
might make more sense, at least when combined with vigorous en-
forcement of anticompetitive settlements.
The GAAP bill also addresses 180-day exclusivity by requiring its
forfeiture if the applicant either fails to receive approval within thirty
months, fails to enter within sixty days of a favorable appellate verdict,
or is found by the FTC to have engaged in an unlawful settlement.
In summary, while there are arguments both for and against the 180-
day rule, its current implementation creates gaming problems. Propos-
als that require the forfeiture of the exclusivity period on the signing
of any delayed entry agreement are designed to prevent firms from
taking actions that defer the entry of third parties.
Pseudo-Generics
The difficulty in dealing with pseudo-generics is that it is hard to argue
against a company's licensing another firm to manufacture and sell its
product under another name, even if there is a deep suspicion that the
motive was anticompetitive. To some extent, the companies are limited
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Statute. If the brand-name company itself sells a pseudo-generic at a
lower price and then charges Medicaid the higher price for the brand,
then it is breaking the law. Bayer was fined $250 million for alleged over-
charges on high-blood-pressure drug Adalat and antibiotic Cipro. It also
paid a $5 million criminal penalty. GlaxoSmithKline licensed health
maintenance organization (HMO) to become a generic manufacturer of
Paxil, which the HMO then sold only to itself. It agreed to an $87.6 million
fine but was not criminally charged.53 These cases are an indication that
future pseudo-generic production is unlikely to come from generic subsidi-
aries of the brand-name manufacturers.
We have also the broader issue of whether pseudo-generics consti-
tute a form of predation even when they are sold at prices above
marginal cost.There are at least four clear theories of how pseudo-
generics deter entry. The first, already discussed, is reputational. The
second is that, in some cases, a pseudo-generic introduced shortly be-
fore patent expiration could deter other generic entry because surely
there are advantages (versus other generics) to being a perfect substi-
tute for the brand and to being the first generic available to customers.
The third, of course, is that even without early entry, the pseudo-
generic allows the brand to compete for price-sensitive customers with
selective discounting rather than through a general price reduction
a typical price-discrimination story. Fourth, the threat of the brand be-
ing able to introduce a pseudo-generic whenever a true generic is ready
to come to market will reduce entry.
To elaborate on the fourth point, consider the early days of competi-
tion in long-distance telephony. AT&T, the dominant player, was re-
quired to post price changes 120 days in advance, while entrants MCI
and Sprint could cut prices in a day. Consumers could alternately bene-
fit from a substantial incentive to enter or from AT&T pre-empting
entry through low prices. The analogy here would be a rule that, say,
required brands to announce the introduction of a pseudo-generic two
years ahead (easy to do because there are no regulatory hurdles), pre-
sumably with a price attached.55 Of course, this issue is not unique to
pharmaceuticalsit applies to entry against many other dominant
firms. While one may be sympathetic to this argument, it goes beyond
pharmaceuticals and beyond the scope of this paper.
One response by governments that were concerned with the use of
pseudo-generics as a price-discrimination and entry-deterrence device
would be to build on the Medicaid statute by requiring the substitution
of a cheaper pseudo-generic whenever available for any prescription
that specifies the brand.180 Bulow
Banning Cash Settlements and Related Mischief
There is reason to be deeply skeptical of the efficiency justifications for
reverse payments from the licensor to the licensee. Also, because the
value to the brand-name company of keeping the generic out is vastly
greater than the value to the generic of getting in, it is clear that if we
allow complex settlements, the overwhelming incentive of the parties
will be to game the system by transferring resources to the entrant in
return for a postponed entry date.
This does not mean that all settlements, or even that all settlements
in which other resources are part of the settlement, are anticompetitive.
Many of the settlements without reverse payments that were listed in
the FTC report may have been legitimate, with a reservation only about
their interaction with the 180-day rule as currently applied. Settlements
in which entrants clearly make a financial sacrifice to finish the deal,
for example, by selling patent rights to the brand at a price below what
others have offered for the same rights, would be acceptable. An alter-
native rule that allowed settlements whenever the brand could argue
that it did not lose on the side deal, even as the entrant gained substan-
tially, would create an incentive to transfer most of those gains to the
entrant in return for a delayed entry date.
The bottom line is, paying competitors to stay out of the market may
be profitable, but doing so reduces competition and is likely to attract
very close antitrust scrutiny.
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Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301-397 [2001]). A summary of relevant portions
of the Hatch-Waxman Act is set forth in Section 2.
FTC v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., Carderm Capital L.P. and Andrx Corp., Docket No.
9293 (consent order issued May 8, 2001) (FTC Commission Actions: May 11, 2001 [re-
ferred to as "Hoechst -Andrx"]); Abbott Laboratories and Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C-3945,The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents 181
C-3946 (consent orders issued May 22, 2000) (FTC Commission Actions: May, 26, 2000
[referred to as "Abbott-Geneva"]); and In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
FTC files 001 0221, 011 0046, and 021 0181 (referred to as "Bristol -S chein"). The Bristol
Myers consent covered not only an agreement between Bristol and Schein involving
BuSpar, but also alleged Hatch-Waxman abuses by Bristol involving BuSpar, Taxol, and
Platinol.
Schering-Plough Corp. Llpsher-Smith Laboratories, and American Home Products Corp.,
Docket No. 9297 (complaint issued April 2, 2001) (FTC Commission Actions: April 2,
2001 [referred to as "Schering"]). Note that, as part of this matter, American Home Prod-
ucts and its subsidiary ESI Lederle signed a consent agreement with the FTC.
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (on appeal
to the Sixth Circuit); In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340
(S.D. Fla. 2000) (on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit).
Private plaintiffs have challenged the same agreements involving Schering, Upsher-
Smith, and ESI Lederle that are at issue in the FTC case. Suits have also been filed chal-
lenging an agreement between Bayer A.G. and Barr Laboratories, Inc. A federal district
court has issued a decision in this case, which provides a factual background of the
Hatch-Waxman Agreement at issue. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 166 F. Supp. 2d. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
In a paper written contemporaneously with this one, Hovenkamp et. al. (2003) look
at anticompetitive patent settlements more broadly, with special focus on the Hatch-
Waxman cases. They propose a three-part test to determine whether a settlement is prob-
lematic: (1) Would the settlement be problematic if it were not an intellectual property
settlement? (2) Is the settlement more anticompetitive than litigation? (3) Are there alter-
natives to the settlement that would be less restrictive? Their substantive conclusions
are broadly consistent with the conclusions of this paper.
Much of this overview is taken from Chapter 1 of a July 2002 Federal Trade Commis-
sion study entitled "Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration" (available at
www.ftc.gov) ("FTC Generic Drug Study"), and Congressional Budget Office (1998).
After the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, the patent term was changed from
seventeen years from patent grant to twenty years from application filing.
An extension may also be granted for a process patent, which can often be invented
around by a generic.
See Congressional Budget Office (1998) and Grabowski and Vernon (1986).
This includes patents covering the active ingredient, specific formulations, and meth-
ods of use.
The publication is entitled "Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equiva-
lence."
In this article, I refer to ANDAs with Paragraph IV certifications as "Paragraph IV
ANDAs."
On average, when there is no lawsuit, it wifi take a successful ANDA filer 24.5
months to gain approval.
Pharmaceutical patent cases begin in District Court and then go to the Court of Ap-
peals. The FDA originally interpreted this provision as applying to a final, unappealable182 Bulow
verdict, but for ANDAs ified after March 2000, the thirty-month stay ends with a District
Court verdict in favor of the generic. The FTC estimates that the average time from filing
to a district court verdict in Paragraph TV cases has been 25.5 months, but the time can
be extended by an appeal. In recent years, as Orange Book filings have listed more pat-
ents, the length of litigation has increased.
On various occasions, the FDA has used either a District Court or an Appeals Court
decision to motivate the start of the 180-day clock.
I refer to the restraint within this provision of the agreement as a relinquishing re-
straint. A similar provision was also included in the Abbott-Geneva agreement.
I refer to the restraint within this provision of the agreement as a noninfringing re-
straint. A similar provision was also included in the Abbott-Geneva and Schering and
Upsher-Smith agreements.
Presumably this was usually because it was clear that the generic's product did not
infringe, though it is possible in some cases that the brand simply did not feel a lawsuit
was worth the cost. The majority of products that did not provoke suits had sales of
under $100 miffion per year, while the median volume for those that did lead to litigation
was $190 million (Federal Trade Commission 2002, p. 14). Also, in some cases, the brand
may have simply felt that the generic would be unable to come to market before the
expiration of the patent anyway; in two cases, the patents did expire before the FDA
approved the ANDA.
See FTC, In the Matter of Biovail Corp. and Elan Corp., File No. 011 0132,
Agreement Containing Consent Order, available at http:/ /www.ftc.gov/os/2002/06/
biovailelanagreement.pdf.
Cotter (2003) argues persuasively that litigation costs are often significant. However,
significant litigation costs will generally improve the bargaining position of the brand
because such costs will be a smaller fraction of the amount it has at risk. Therefore, high
litigation costs would imply that settlements without monetary transfers would already
postpone entry beyond the actuarially fair date.
The reason is that, while generic entry does not appear to lead to lower brand prices
(Frank and Salkever [1997] actually find an increase), it does lead to lower generic prices.
So the implication is that the brand loss from one versus two entrants is proportional
to lost sales, while the consumer benefit is greater than that because of the price reduction
caused by the second generic. The assumption would not hold if the elasticity of over-
all demand with respect to the generic's price was much greater for entry of the first
firm.
Note that while the settlement is actuarially better than fair, the number of expected
monopoly days increases because the exclusion period is all days that would have been
monopoly days, while the entry period includes days in which the second filer may have
entered.
If the settlement were contingent on the outcome of the second ifier's litigation, in-
cluding immediate entry if the second filer won, then an actuarially fair settlement would
make everyone no better or worse off.
Or even more profitably, the firms could theoretically agree to contingent entry, with
the entry date negatively correlated with the second firm's litigation success.
See, for example, Reiffen and Ward (2002), who estimate the impact of multiple en-
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In the Nash bargaining solution, the settlement will be such that the ratio of the
marginal value of an extra piece of the pie to the average value (above their threat point)
must be the same for all bargainers. At the level of the risk-neutral settlement, the entrant,
who has much less at stake, will have a higher ratio of marginal value to average value
than will the brand and therefore will be able to credibly insist on a better deal.
This is precise with Cournot oligopoly and linear demand. Assume a market demand
curve of p = a - bQ, where Q is the sum of the brand's and the generic's output. Marginal
costs are normalized to zero for the brand; for the entrant, they are equal to a royalty
rate z. The royalty rate determines the quantities and profits of the two firms. The quan-
tity-setting equilibrium is that the market quantity is (2a - z) / 3b; market price is (a +
R) / 3; the entrant earns (a - 2z)2 / 9b; and the brand earns (a + z)2 / 9b + z(a - 2z) /3b,
the latter expression being its royalties. The derivative of entrant profits with respect to
R is 4(a - 2R) / 9b, while the derivative of brand profits is 5(a - 2z) / 9b. Thus, for any
royalty rate below a/2 (at which no entry occurs), the monopolist loses $5 in profits for
every $4 gained by the entrant. For the case of generics, assume that the brand's price
does not change in the face of generic competition, as appears to be roughly true. Thus,
a cut in the royalty rate provides a first-order increase in profits to the generic, which
can maintain its old price. The generic can also choose to cut price a bit further, which
it would likely do, having a second-order impact on its own profits but a first-order
impact on the brand's, which would make the brand's profits fall by more than the gain
to the generic.
Because the generic and the brand are not, in fact, completely identical products,
the comparison becomes more difficult. For example, assume that production costs are
identical but consumers would pay a bit more for the brand, perhaps because they prefer
the brand's "fills" or think that it is less risky. Also assume that the entry of a brand
leads to an overall increase in sales but a decrease in the sales of the incumbent. Then
generic entry, while it will always necessarily increase consumer surplus, might be inef-
ficient. The issue for efficiency is whether the margins on the new customers brought
into the market by the presence of the generics are greater or smaller than the lost effi-
ciency from consumers who would have bought the brand but now switch to a generic
that they value less, while the two producers have the same marginal costs of production.
See Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985), pp. 504-505. As I argue later, the real
value that the generics provide may be through appropriate enforcement of the patent
laws.
See Engelberg (1999), p. 415.
A metabolite is the chemical compound in which a patient's body metabolizes the
drug. Sometimes it is the metabolite that causes the therapeutic effect. Of course, only the
patient can directly infringe such a patent, but patentees wifi claim that the generic helps
create the infringement. One district court has ruled that a metabolite patent does not
"claim the drug," as required in Hatch-Waxman, and such patents should not be listed.
More than one chemical structure may create the same active ingredient. If poly-
morphs are substantially identical, then the various polymorphs that create the same
active ingredient as the one for which the brand obtains its NDA would appear to be
eligible for inclusion under the brand's original patent. However, if the polymorph is
substantially identical it would appear to be precluded from patenting several years after
the initial filing, based on the prior art of the original. On the other hand, if the poly-
morph is not substantially identical, then the production of the polymorph would
not seem to infringe on the NDA and the polymorph would not appear to qualify for
Orange Book listing. Further, even if late patenting of the polymorph were permissible
under a theory of "double patenting" (see footnote 34), we have the separate issue184 Bulow
of whether firms should be allowed to use this technique to restart the thirty-month
clock.
Patents about the way the drug is made.
To this end, some have argued that an expedited administrative system of determin-
ing patent legitimacy (or, in this case also, relevancy to the production of the chemical
entity) would be extremely helpful. See, for example, Merges (1999) and Levin and Levin
(2002).
When a new patent would be invalidated by the applicant's own prior art, the patent
office will sometimes agree to the new patent conditional on the termination date being
set equal to the termination date of the original patent. The FTC study discusses Bristol
Myers's double patenting of Platinol (cisplatin) (Federal Trade Commission 2002, pp.
A34A35).
The material in this section is based on Buehler (2001).
Of course, financial market theory says that if the management were operating in
the best interests of its shareholders, it would have been risk-neutral relative to this risk
if the risk were not correlated with the stock market as a whole.
Schering had approximately $500 million in unrealized pension losses at the end of
2002. While hardly alone, the decision of the company to gamble with its pension assets
rather than hedge its benefit liabilities is relevant to any discussion of its risk tolerance.
Okay, they don't quite say it this way, but it is what they say.
While these payments were referred to as loans in the deal documents, lawyers were
evasive when asked whether, for tax and accounting purposes, the companies treated
the payments as income and expense or as loans.
That said, the FTC study reports that out of fourteen cases where the brand appealed
a district court verdict, the generic won thirteen times. The last case was a split decision
in which one of two patents were upheld.
The classic reference is Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
Actually, mechanism design theory suggests that the parties in this example might
do even better by initially agreeing to swap about half of the two assets rather than 100
percent, and then using a bargaining mechanism as proposed by Cramton, Gibbons, and
Klemperer (1987), which could likely achieve full efficiency.
Leary (2001) rightly points to this as an additional reason to be skeptical of any
reverse payment settlements. This viewpoint is in contrast to the analysis of Blair,
in Blair and Cotter (2002), who argued that, because the FTC could not estimate the
outcome of litigation, any reverse payment that was less than 100 percent of what the
entrant would have earned from marketing a noninfringing product should be lawful.
Cotter (2003) argued that Blair's approach was too extreme; his preferred methodology
(Blair and Cotter 2002) would be a "quick look" approach, in which the burden of the
plaintiff would be to show that reverse payments had been made, with the burden then
shifting to the defendant to show that the settlement was nevertheless not anti-
competitive.
Licenses with royalty fees, where the marginal royalty rate did not fall with quantity
sold and where the brand was not obligated to produce the licensed product, also do
not appear to create any gaming incentives.The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents 185
Quoted m'How Companies Stall Generics and Keep Themselves Healthy," by
Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Jeff Gerth, The New York Times, Section 1, page 1. July 23, 2000.
One argument of the brands has been that, as a practical matter, they might have
trouble obtaining a stay even when the merits of the case point toward their receiving
one. Without commenting on the merits of this argument, the one automatic-stay provi-
sion would address this concern.
Rosenthal (2001) wrote a very good paper advocating the McCain-Schumer bill dis-
cussed below; Engelberg (1999) preceded the bill and presents the case for eliminating
both the thirty-month and 180-day rules.
5. 812, 107th Cong. (2001).
Note, however, that the benefits created by the generic may exceed those suggested
by looking at the generic demand curve. That is because of the moral hazard problem
caused by third-party payment for medicines. Therefore, looking at the price differential
that is required to have a consumer switch to a generic will overstate, perhaps sub-
stantially, the consumer's preference for the brand and equally any social costs of a
switch.
If we think of generic entry decisions being made stochastically, a firm would still
profit, even without the 180 days in the one case where it added valuenamely, when
there were no other entrants. Of course, one could always argue that generics provide
a particularly high (or low) amount of social benefit per dollar of profit they earn, and
so it would be efficient to subsidize (tax) them. I also note that there are cases when the
180-day rule is of no practical value because, for example, the brand may have won an
additional three years of "pediatric exclusivity." In this case, even if the generic wins
its case, it cannot enter until the end of the exclusivity period, but the 180-day clock
starts immediately on a verdict.
One of the reasons that pseudo-generics, or branded drugs sold separately as gener-
ics, are such tough competition is that they are, in fact, identical to branded drugs, down
to the last filler ingredient. That makes them a more perfect substitute than any other
possible product.
See "Drug Co.'s Settle Medicaid Fraud Suits," April 16,2003, at CBSNEWS.com. See
also the press release "GlaxoSmithKline, Government Reach Civil Settlement," April 16,
2003, on the Glaxo web site. <www.gsk.com/media/archive.htrn> accessed June 2,
2003.
See, for example, Liang (1996) and Hollis (2003).
Edlin (2002) alternatively suggests that if an entrant undercuts an incumbent by 20
percent or more, the incumbent should be prohibited from responding for twelve to
eighteen months.
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